Files
J621/backend/apps/accounts/models.py
T
JakeBreath f86eccf9a3 Security fixes: SSRF, staff role escalation, SPA-only gating, throttling, encrypted keys
Findings from the audit (50-check harness across guest/user/uploader/staff/
admin) and their fixes:

- SSRF: 'Download to Library' and the staged-upload resolve path fetched
  any http(s) URL. services.validate_remote_url now enforces the e621
  media allowlist and open_remote re-validates every redirect hop; the
  download-task create endpoint and the guest proxy use them, so internal
  addresses (127.0.0.1, LAN, metadata) are rejected with 400.
- Privilege escalation: staff could promote users to staff and demote
  other staff. Role changes across the staff boundary now require an
  admin, matching the account-deletion rules; the Users page hides what
  the backend would refuse.
- SPA-only gating: /api/storage/ and /api/duplicates/* were readable by
  any authenticated account (absolute paths, duplicate groups) while the
  SPA only shows them to uploaders. They now require CanUpload.
- Throttling (REST_FRAMEWORK, env-overridable, counted in Redis):
  anon 120/min, user 600/min, login 5/min, register 20/hour, guest e621
  proxy 60/hour. Login now goes through a throttled view.
- e621 API keys are encrypted at rest with a Fernet key derived from
  SECRET_KEY (apps/accounts/crypto.py); a data migration encrypts existing
  rows and the column widens first. Reads decrypt transparently, legacy
  plaintext still works, and a changed SECRET_KEY reads as 'not
  configured' instead of leaking. Rotating SECRET_KEY now invalidates
  stored keys as well as signed media URLs.
- Hardening: the server refuses to start with DEBUG=False while SECRET_KEY
  is still the development default.

Verified: corrected harness 50/50 (guest visibility, IDOR, signed-URL
tamper/expiry, staged-upload/similarity privacy, role matrix, SSRF),
login throttles at the 6th attempt with 429, anon polling unaffected, the
guest proxy still reaches allowlisted hosts, live e621 auth works with the
decrypted key, and DB rows hold only ciphertext.
2026-09-18 00:21:14 -05:00

53 lines
1.7 KiB
Python

from django.contrib.auth.models import AbstractUser
from django.db import models
class User(AbstractUser):
"""Project user with optional e621 API credentials and an app role."""
ROLE_USER = "user"
ROLE_UPLOADER = "uploader"
ROLE_STAFF = "staff"
ROLE_CHOICES = [
(ROLE_USER, "User"),
(ROLE_UPLOADER, "Uploader"),
(ROLE_STAFF, "Staff"),
]
role = models.CharField(max_length=20, choices=ROLE_CHOICES, default=ROLE_USER)
avatar = models.ForeignKey(
"library.MediaItem",
null=True,
blank=True,
on_delete=models.SET_NULL,
related_name="+",
)
e621_username = models.CharField(max_length=100, blank=True, default="")
# Stored encrypted (see apps/accounts/crypto.py): never the plaintext key.
e621_api_key = models.CharField(max_length=400, blank=True, default="")
e621_base_url = models.CharField(max_length=200, default="https://e621.net")
# Per-user browse preferences (landing page, default filters, grid size).
preferences = models.JSONField(default=dict, blank=True)
@property
def e621_api_key_plain(self):
"""The decrypted e621 key ("" when it cannot be decrypted)."""
from .crypto import decrypt_secret
return decrypt_secret(self.e621_api_key)
@property
def e621_configured(self):
return bool(self.e621_username and self.e621_api_key_plain)
@property
def can_upload(self):
return self.is_superuser or self.role in {self.ROLE_UPLOADER, self.ROLE_STAFF}
@property
def is_app_staff(self):
"""Staff in this app: superusers, Django staff, or the staff role."""
return bool(
self.is_superuser or self.is_staff or self.role == self.ROLE_STAFF
)