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J621/AGENTS.md
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JakeBreath 30b1a1a4b0 Tailnet-only (Serve, no Funnel) compose variants
Three more composes — compose.tailnet.yml, compose.tailnet.frontend.yml,
compose.tailnet.backend.yml — mirror the funnel set exactly but mount
serve.default/frontend/backend.tailnet.json, which drop AllowFunnel. The
sidecar still registers and serves HTTPS with a tailnet certificate, but
nothing is exposed publicly; Serve also needs no ACL change.

Project names carry a -tailnet suffix so both sets can coexist, and the
README explains that each set needs its own data directory (or host), plus
how to switch a host between funnel and tailnet by starting the other file
with the same .env.

Verified: all six composes validate with docker compose config, and the
six serve configs split cleanly into funnel (AllowFunnel present) and
tailnet-only (absent).
2026-09-18 11:21:48 -05:00

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Markdown

Use the venv on backend/venv/
DO NOT mess with the system's python
For Frontend work:
read both Frontend Design related Markdown files on the frontend/ folder
For anything touching e621 endpoints or payloads (posts, pools, tags, users,
favorites, IQDB, blacklists, uploads), consult the e621 OpenAPI spec first:
https://e621.wiki/openapi.yaml
Download it once per session (it is ~450 KB YAML), then grep it for the exact
path/parameter/schema names instead of guessing:
curl -sL https://e621.wiki/openapi.yaml -o /tmp/opencode/e621-openapi.yaml
grep -n "^ /pools.json" /tmp/opencode/e621-openapi.yaml
Notes learned from the spec (verify before trusting):
- Index endpoints often return a bare array (e.g. GET /pools.json) while the
show endpoint returns the object directly (e.g. GET /pools/{id}.json) — not
always wrapped in a named key.
- Pools index supports search[order] (id_asc, id_desc, name, created_at,
post_count), search[name_matches], search[category], search[is_active].
- Own settings (including user[blacklisted_tags]) are updated with
PATCH /users/{id}.json as form-encoded data; /users/me.json returns the user
object at the top level.
Project constraints (do not regress):
- Backend is Django 6 + DRF with token auth (no session auth on the API);
MariaDB/Redis come from docker-compose.yml.
- Deployment will be Docker-based (compose); do not add systemd/cron unit
files for scheduling — use the container setup for timers/workers.
- deploy/ is the deployment source of truth: J621-Frontend (SPA on static
nginx) and J621-Backend (gunicorn + whitenoise, ffmpeg, migrations on
start), three compose variants (both / frontend-only / backend-only) behind
a shared nginx proxy service, and a Tailscale sidecar per compose.
serve.*.json are the public Funnel variants (only ports 443 / 8443 / 10000);
serve.*.tailnet.json + compose.tailnet*.yml are the same stacks without
AllowFunnel (tailnet-only, no public exposure). Images are pushed to the
Gitea registry with deploy/push_*.sh (multi-arch, :latest + :sha, GIT_HASH
baked in for the version pill).
- Security/permission tests live in backend/apps/core/tests and need a
one-time grant: GRANT ALL ON `test_j621`.* TO 'j621'@'%';
Dev environment (this machine):
- MariaDB/Redis run from the repo root: `docker compose up -d` (host ports
3307 and 6380 — other local projects own 3305/6379/3406).
- Backend dev server: `backend/venv/bin/python manage.py runserver 0.0.0.0:8000`.
Django's system checks touch the database, so start MariaDB first; run it
from backend/ with the venv python.
- Frontend dev server: `npm run dev` in frontend/ — Vite listens on
[::1]:5173 (http://localhost:5173) and proxies /api to 127.0.0.1:8000.
- Restarting: kill dev servers by PID from `pgrep -af`; never
`pkill -f "manage.py runserver"` (the pattern matches its own shell).
- Suite: `backend/venv/bin/python manage.py test apps.core.tests` (~80 s).
- Same-origin and cross-origin frontends both work, and the SPA can also run
with no backend at all: a production build asks on first start (/setup) and
stores the answer in localStorage — a URL, "" for same origin, or "none"
for local mode. Local mode shows only the e621-facing pages (Online, Pools)
with credentials kept in this browser (j621.e621) and a "Setup Backend"
button in the shell. DEFAULT_BACKEND_URL in frontend/src/lib/backend.ts is
the prefilled default; the backend allows extra origins via
CORS_ALLOWED_ORIGINS (plus CSRF_TRUSTED_ORIGINS for the admin), and API
media URLs are absolute (built from the request host), so signed files load
cross-origin too. TRUST_PROXY_HEADERS=true is required behind a
TLS-terminating proxy.
- No server-side media processing: the home server cannot handle it.
Compression/optimization runs client-side (WebCodecs + WASM in a worker)
and the server only applies the result via POST /api/files/J-x/optimize/.
- Do not use imgdd; perceptual hashing is imagehash server-side.
- Chat/messaging features are out of scope.
Security hardening (do not weaken):
- e621 API keys are stored Fernet-encrypted with a key derived from
SECRET_KEY (apps/accounts/crypto.py); rotating SECRET_KEY invalidates them
(and all signed media URLs), so users must re-enter the key.
- API throttles live in REST_FRAMEWORK (env-overridable): anon 120/min,
user 600/min, login 5/min, register 20/hour, e621_proxy 60/hour.
- Only admins (superusers) may grant/revoke the staff role or delete
staff/admin accounts; staff manage regular/uploader accounts only.
- Storage, duplicates, delete, temp-clear, uploads and downloads require
upload rights (CanUpload), not merely authentication.
- Server-side fetching only happens for allowlisted e621 media hosts via
services.validate_remote_url / open_remote (every redirect hop is
re-validated); do not call requests.get on user-supplied URLs elsewhere.
- A repeatable audit harness (permission matrix, IDOR, guest visibility,
signed URLs, SSRF, throttles) was used to verify this; formalising it as
a test suite is still open in the roadmap.