Findings from the audit (50-check harness across guest/user/uploader/staff/
admin) and their fixes:
- SSRF: 'Download to Library' and the staged-upload resolve path fetched
any http(s) URL. services.validate_remote_url now enforces the e621
media allowlist and open_remote re-validates every redirect hop; the
download-task create endpoint and the guest proxy use them, so internal
addresses (127.0.0.1, LAN, metadata) are rejected with 400.
- Privilege escalation: staff could promote users to staff and demote
other staff. Role changes across the staff boundary now require an
admin, matching the account-deletion rules; the Users page hides what
the backend would refuse.
- SPA-only gating: /api/storage/ and /api/duplicates/* were readable by
any authenticated account (absolute paths, duplicate groups) while the
SPA only shows them to uploaders. They now require CanUpload.
- Throttling (REST_FRAMEWORK, env-overridable, counted in Redis):
anon 120/min, user 600/min, login 5/min, register 20/hour, guest e621
proxy 60/hour. Login now goes through a throttled view.
- e621 API keys are encrypted at rest with a Fernet key derived from
SECRET_KEY (apps/accounts/crypto.py); a data migration encrypts existing
rows and the column widens first. Reads decrypt transparently, legacy
plaintext still works, and a changed SECRET_KEY reads as 'not
configured' instead of leaking. Rotating SECRET_KEY now invalidates
stored keys as well as signed media URLs.
- Hardening: the server refuses to start with DEBUG=False while SECRET_KEY
is still the development default.
Verified: corrected harness 50/50 (guest visibility, IDOR, signed-URL
tamper/expiry, staged-upload/similarity privacy, role matrix, SSRF),
login throttles at the 6th attempt with 429, anon polling unaffected, the
guest proxy still reaches allowlisted hosts, live e621 auth works with the
decrypted key, and DB rows hold only ciphertext.
JakeBreath
f86eccf9a3